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The Court of Audit published an audit report entitled ICT in the Police Service 2010 on 23 June 2011. The audit was carried out at the request of the Minister of Security and Justice. The request was made at the insistence of the House of Representatives in mid-November 2010. The report includes a reconstruction of developments in ICT in the police service and an analysis of the problems and risks in the steering and management of ICT. One of the main developments in recent years was the establishment of the Dutch Police Cooperation Facility (VTSPN) in July 2006. The audit paid special attention to the information systems in place for police officers and detectives, such as the standard facilities for enforcement (BVH), investigation (BVO) and capacity management (BVCM).
Our audit found that the police service had made little progress finding permanent solutions to ICT problems in the past ten years. Information systems such as the BVH and BVO provide inadequate support for police work. The BVH and BVO are not future proof, have poor user interfaces and were not introduced uniformly. Regional police force managers have too little grip on ICT. The heads of the police forces stuck to their own regional procedures. The minister's supervision was inadequate. The distance between ICT decision-makers and the shop floor was too great. In consequence, police officers were overlooked and lost confidence in ICT.
Regional police force managers (the competent mayors of the main
cities) were unable to fulfil their responsibilities for ICT
management. Under political pressure, they insisted on hard
milestones for the introduction of the standard facilities in the
hope that that would prevent the introduction of a national police
service. The regional police force managers and heads of the police
forces gave priority to planning. The quality and practicality of
the systems came second.
Decision-making on the introduction of the standard facilities was
inadequate. Not all costs, for example, were taken into account.
The decision to base the BVH and BVO on outdated systems meant they
were not future proof. The BVH was introduced in 26 versions and
the BVO in 6 versions because the heads of the police forces wanted
to adhere to their own procedures. There were also differences in
technical infrastructures. The heads of the police forces also
inadequately prepared their staff for the introduction of the
standard facilities. This undermined support for ICT projects in
the police service. Another consequence was that the police forces
took their own initiatives to find alternatives and implemented
them on an ad hoc basis.
The VTSPN plays a key role in the development and management of ICT in the police service. It provides ICT services to the police forces in seven service areas (six regional and one national). Since the facility was set up in 2006, however, its management has been unable to establish a healthy ICT organisation. The problems include the large number of applications and the high cost of the service areas, compounded by legacy systems and platforms. Operational management improved following the appointment of a new Board in 2009 and management changes at the VTSPN but the problems are substantial and persistent.
The standard facilities have poor user interfaces. The systems are cumbersome, have slow response rates and are not fully compatibility with the tasks they are designed to perform. The information systems accordingly increase the administrative burden borne by police staff.
We found indications that police officers avoid the BVH or classify incidents more 'lightly'. A fine then suffices that does not need to be entered in the BVH. There are also disadvantages for the forces' policy information and crime statistics. These disadvantages, however, are difficult to express in figures. The introduction of the BVH may have contributed to the decline in the number of cases the police pass on to the Public Prosecution Service. The downward trend, however, had already started before the introduction of the BVH. Other factors probably also play a role.
At the start of the
development and introduction of the three standard facilities (BVH,
BVO and BVCM), the cost was estimated at approximately €46 million.
Actual expenditure came to €70 million. This figure represents only
part of the total costs as it does not include staff and
implementation costs at the police forces themselves.
As in 2003, we found that insight into ICT costs in the police
service was limited. An external consultancy calculated the ICT
costs in the police service in 2009 at €770 million. Maintenance
and management costs are making an ever greater demand on the ICT
budget. The financial scope for ICT innovations is therefore
shrinking.
The organisation and management of ICT in the police service is complex. Reforming the police service from a regional into a national service could help improve control. However, it would not automatically resolve the problems. The organisation and management of ICT must be simplified and strengthened. The police forces' procedures should be harmonised and administrative burdens should be reduced. The culture in the police service must also be reformed so that police officers come first and confidence is strengthened.
We made a large number of recommendations in the report to improve the management and control of ICT in the police service. The organisation, for example, must be simplified and responsibilities must be clarified. The national Chief Information Officer should play a central role in these changes. Cost accounts, risk management, strategy, accountability, audit and supervision must be improved. We also recommend that the seven service areas be reorganised into one central service area.
The Minister of Security and Justice wrote in his response that
he would adopt our recommendations in his action plan to modernise
ICT in the police service. According to the Board of the regional
police force managers, the former directors of the VTSPN were
over-reliant on the VTSPN's managers and on the involvement of
the heads of the police forces. The Board of Chief Constables
questioned some of the conclusions. It found that the report paid
insufficient attention to the specific responsibilities of the
regional police force managers. They and the heads of the police
forces agreed that the allocation of responsibilities should be
very clear in the new police service.
We noted in our afterword that it is still uncertain how the
minister will incorporate our recommendations into his plans.