Counter-Terrorism Alert System

• Conclusions and recommendations
• NCTb inadequately fulfils management function
• Response of the Ministers and the Court of Audit's afterword

In response to the attacks in Madrid in 2004 the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) announced in September of that year that a National Alert System (NAS) would be introduced to inform the authorities, business community and public about current terrorist threats and risks. Although the NAS has not yet been established, a Counter-Terrorism Alert System (ATb) has been set up to warn key sectors of industry, municipalities and police forces about increased terrorist threats. The National Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) is responsible for the ATb. Our audit considered whether the ATb would actually increase the speed of decision-making in response to a warning.

Conclusions and recommendations

Organisation meets the requirements but is not yet optimal

In broad lines, the organisation of the ATb meets the applicable requirements. Some 13 sectors of industry are now participating in the system and locations have been identified in these sectors that are a potential target for terrorist attack. The parties involved have also made agreements on the measures to be taken for each threat level (low, moderate or high). The practicality of the measures (for example hiring security firms or using specific equipment such as scanners), however, has not yet been studied. Capacity problems will probably arise if the threat level is high or prolonged. We therefore recommend that the practicality of the proposed measures be assessed.

Confusing and unwieldy preventive systems

In addition to the ATb, other initiatives have been taken to increase the security of critical sectors, for example the Critical Infrastructure Protection measures (BVI). The BVI is coordinated by the Minister of BZK and the ATb by the Minister of Justice. This does not facilitate an integrated approach. Local parties and sectors find the co-existence of different preventive systems for different types of threat confusing and unwieldy. We recommend that central government take action to arrive at the simplest modus operandi for all involved.

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NCTb inadequately fulfils management function

The NCTb inadequately fulfils its function as manager of the ATb chain. Such a function is essential. Whether the ATb will actually speed up decision-making to prevent attacks will depend in part on good cooperation between public and private parties. Local authorities, however, do not always know what is expected of them. Coordination of industry, authorities and the police has had mixed results. We recommend that the Ministers of Justice and BZK clarify the management function so that there is greater oversight of the ATb's operation.

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Response of the Ministers and the Court of Audit's afterword

In their response to our report, the Ministers of BZK and of Justice wrote that further elaboration of the NCTb's management function might frustrate rather than promote local cooperation. They also noted that they did not wish to determine mathematically whether there would be sufficient resources for the security measures required for high or protracted threat levels. They thought this would be barely feasible for all potential targets and sectors at macro level.

In our afterword, we observed that the NCTb should have an oversight of the ATb's operation without assuming the tasks of local authorities and sectors. Furthermore, we had not called for a mathematical calculation of the necessary resources but for a better estimate in advance in order to avoid an unexpected increase in resource needs if the terrorist threat increased.

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